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A general approach to information correction and fusion for belief functions is proposed,
where not only may the information items be irrelevant, but sources may lie as well. We
introduce a new correction scheme, which takes into account uncertain metaknowledge
on the source’s relevance and truthfulness and that generalizes Shafer’s discounting oper-
ation. We then show how to reinterpret all connectives of Boolean logic in terms of source
behavior assumptions with respect to relevance and truthfulness. We are led to generalize
the unnormalized Dempster’s rule to all Boolean connectives, while taking into account the
uncertainties pertaining to assumptions concerning the behavior of sources. Eventually, we
further extend this approach to an even more general setting, where source behavior as-
sumptions do not have to be restricted to relevance and truthfulness. We also establish the
commutativity property between correction and fusion processes, when the behaviors of
the sources are independent.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Quand deux témoins me disent une chose, il faut, pour que je me trompe en ajoutant foi à leur témoignage, que l’un & l’autre
m’induisent en erreur; si je suis sûr de l’un des deux, peu m’importe que l’autre soit croyable. Or la probabilité que l’un & l’autre
me trompent, est une probabilité composée de deux probabilités, que le premier trompe, & que le second trompe. Celle du premier
est 1/10 (puisque la probabilité que la chose est conforme à son rapport est 9/10); la probabilité que le second me trompe aussi,
est encore 1/10: donc la probabilité composée est la dixième d’une dixième ou 1/100; donc la probabilité du contraire, c’est-à-dire
celle que l’un ou l’autre dit vrai, est 99/100. Entry “Probabilité”, Encyclopedia of D’Alembert and Diderot, XVIIIth century.
1. Introduction
The problem of constructing an agent’s knowledge on the value taken by a parameter x defined on a domain X , where
the agent’s sole information on the parameter comes from one or many sources, has gained increased interest in the last 20
years with the development of various kinds of information systems. This problem is actually as old as probability theory: its
roots can be traced at least back to the formalization of the reliability of testimonies (see, for instance, the entry “Probabilité”
in D’Alembert and Diderot’s famous XVIIIth century Encyclopedia1).
It is not possible for an agent to evaluate the pieces of information provided by several sources, unless some meta-
knowledge on the sources is available to this agent. Typically,meta-knowledge on the sources amounts to assumptions about
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their relevance. If a source providing a testimony of the form x ∈ A is relevant with probability p, then one assumes that
the corresponding information is not useful with probability 1− p. In the context of the theory of belief functions [4,22,31],
this is known as the discounting of a piece of information [22,27] and the resulting state of knowledge is represented by a
simple support function [22]: the weight p is allocated to the fact of being able to state x ∈ Awith certainty, and the weight
1− p is allocated to the tautology (it becomes the probability of knowing nothing from the source). If the agent receives the
piece of information x ∈ A from two independent sources, with respective reliabilities p1 and p2, then Dempster’s rule of
combination [4,22], justifies attaching reliability p1 + p2 − p1p2 to the statement x ∈ A (this was already explained in full
details in the D’Alembert and Diderot Encyclopedia, see the above-mentioned entry).
In this paper, it is proposed to also take into account some meta-knowledge on the truthfulness of the sources. We
study how the information provided by a single source is modified, or corrected [16], when the agent has some uncertain
meta-knowledge on relevance and truthfulness of the source. The case where multiple sources provide information is also
thoroughly investigated. This study is performed in the framework of the theory of belief functions. It leads to a general
approach to the correction (single source case) and fusion (multiple sources case) of belief functions. This exploration is
then pushed forward and further extended to an even more general setting, where assumptions about information sources
do not have to be restricted to relevance and truthfulness.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The notion of truthfulness is added to the notion of relevance in Section 2,
where a thorough study of what this addition brings to the problems of information correction and fusion is conducted. In
Section 3, this investigation is pursued by allowing for general source behavior assumptions that go beyond the notions of
relevance and truthfulness. A link between information correction and fusion processes, when the behaviors of the sources
are independent, is exhibited in Section 4. Some relationships with previous works are outlined in Section 5. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2. Relevance and truthfulness
It is assumed here that the reliability of a source of information involves two dimensions: its relevance and its truthfulness.
A source is said to be relevant if it provides useful information regarding a given question of interest. If the source is a human
agent, irrelevance means that the provided information does not pertain to the question it answers, for instance because
the agent is actually ignorant. If the source is a sensor, the sensor response is typically irrelevant when it is out of order. For
instance, it is useless to try and find the time it is from a clock that is not working since there is no way to knowwhether the
supplied information is correct or not (the hour read on a broken watch can even be correct). In contrast, a source is said to
be truthful if it actually supplies the information it possesses. There are various forms of lack of truthfulness. A source may
declare the contrary of what it knows, or just say less, or something different, even if consistent with its knowledge. Lack of
truthfulness for a sensor may take the form of a systematic bias. Note that if the the agent receiving information does not
know in which way the source lies, the difference between irrelevance and lack of truthfulness of a source becomes itself
less significant from the standpoint of this agent.
2.1. The case of a single source
Suppose a single sourceprovides informationon the value of somedeterministic parameter x rangingona setX of possible
values (for instance, somebody’s birth-date). Such a piece of information may be of the form “All the source knows is that
x ∈ A” where A is a proper non-empty subset of X , supposedly containing the actual value of x. We assume that ∅ ⊂ A ⊂ X
becausewe consider as a source any entity that supplies a non-trivial and non-self-contradictory input. If the source declares
not to know the value of x, this would be modeled by A = X . However, such information is immaterial for the purpose of
information fusion. For simplicity, in the following, we shall assume a crude description of the lack of truthfulness, namely
that the source declares the opposite of what it knows to be true. The difference between a source known to lie in this way,
and a source known to be irrelevant is that it is possible to retrieve the actual information from the former, while the latter
is totally useless.
Knowledge about whether a source is reliable or not, truthful or not differs from the knowledge supplied by the source.
It is higher order knowledge and is called meta-knowledge. If the source that declares x ∈ A is known to be irrelevant, the
agent receiving this information can always replace it by the trivial information x ∈ X , whether the source is truthful or not.
If the source is relevant and is known to lie in the way assumed above, the agent should replace it by x ∈ A, where A is the
complement of A.
2.1.1. Crisp testimony and uncertain meta-knowledge
However, the difficulty is that, in general, the meta-information is uncertain. Consider the frame of discernment H
describing the possible states of the source. Define H = R × T , with R = {R,¬R} and T = {T,¬T}, as the domain of
the pair of Boolean variables (hR, hT ), where R means relevant and T means truthful. Meta-knowledge about a source may
take the form of subjective probabilities prob(hR, hT ) about the state of the source. Following Dempster’s approach [4], a
multiple-valued function ΓA fromH to X can be defined such that:
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ΓA(R, T) = A;
ΓA(R,¬T) = A;
ΓA(¬R, T) = Γ (¬R,¬T) = X.
ΓA(h) interprets the testimony x ∈ A in each configuration h of the source. Hence, this piece of information will be system-
atically interpreted by a belief function in the sense of Shafer [22], with mass functionmX on X defined by
mX(A) = prob(R, T),
mX(A) = prob(R,¬T),
mX(X) = prob(¬R) = prob(¬R, T) + prob(¬R,¬T).
A mass function mX on X is formally a probability distribution on the power set of X (hence
∑
A⊆X mX(A) = 1). In this
uncertainty theory, the massmX(A) is assigned to the possibility of stating x ∈ A as a faithful representation of the available
knowledge; it does not evaluate the likelihood of event A like does a subjective probability prob(A). Philosophically, and in
analogy to modal logic, the probability prob(A) could be called a de re probability, while mX(A) can be understood as a de
dicto probability (in opposition to the usual probabilistic tradition).
Let q = prob(T|R) and p = prob(R). Assuming ∅ ⊂ A ⊂ X , it is easily found that
mX(A) = p · q; (1)
mX(A) = p · (1 − q); (2)
mX(X) = 1 − p, (3)
corresponding, respectively, to the cases where the source is relevant and truthful, relevant and untruthful, and irrelevant.
In practice, it can be assumed that the relevance of a source is independent of its truthfulness, although Eqs. (1)–(3) show
that this is not necessary in our approach. In this case, the probability distribution on H is defined from the probability
p = prob(R) that it is relevant and q = prob(T) the probability of its being truthful.
2.1.2. Uncertain testimony and meta-knowledge
More generally, one may assume that the information supplied by a source already takes the form of any kind of mass
functionmXS on X (especially,m
X
S (X) > 0 and/orm
X
S (∅) > 0 could be allowed). Assuming that the source is in a given state
h, then each massmXS (A) should be transferred to ΓA(h), yielding the following mass function:
mX(B|h) = ∑
A:ΓA(h)=B
mXS (A), ∀B ⊆ X. (4)
When meta-knowledge on the source is uncertain and each state h has a probability prob(h), then (4) implies that:
mX(B) = ∑
h
mX(B|h)prob(h) = ∑
h
prob(h)
∑
A:ΓA(h)=B
mXS (A). (5)
Let us already remark that (5) may also be recovered using standard operations of belief function theory (i.e., vacuous
extension, Dempter’s rule of combination and marginalization) on the considered pieces of evidence (namely the uncertain
testimony and metaknowledge), as will be shown in Section 4.2 (Lemma 1).
Assuming the uncertain meta-knowledge of the preceding section, i.e., prob(R, T) = pq, prob(R,¬T) = p(1 − q),
prob(¬R, T) = (1− p)q and prob(¬R,¬T) = (1− p)(1− q), leads then to transforming the mass functionmXS into a new
mass function denoted bymX and defined by:
mX = pq mXS + p(1 − q) mXS + (1 − p) mXX, (6)
wheremXS is the (random) set complement ofm [7], defined bym
X
S (A) = mXS (A),∀A ⊆ X , andmXX the vacuousmass function
defined bymXX(X) = 1. We thus get
mX(A) = pq mXS (A) + p(1 − q) mXS (A)
for all A = X and
mX(X) = pq mXS (X) + p(1 − q)mXS (∅) + 1 − p.
This is clearly a generalization of the notion of discounting of a belief function proposed by Shafer [22] to integrate the
reliability of information sources. In the model underlying the discounting operation, the lack of reliability of a source is
assumed to originate in some flawmaking it irrelevant. Our approach adds the possibility of the source lacking truthfulness,
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i.e., lying. 2 Let us also remark that the complement of a mass function is recovered as a special case of this approach: it
corresponds to a relevant source that is lying.
One may as well consider more complex assumptions corresponding to subsets of H, representing epistemic states of
the receiving agent about the source state. For instance, the agent may know that:
• The source is either relevant or truthful but not both, that is R ⊕ T = (R ∧ ¬T) ∨ (¬R ∧ T), corresponding to the
disjunction of two mutually exclusive states.
• The source is relevant or truthful, which is the disjunction R ∨ T of three possible mutually exclusive states ¬R ∧ T ,
R ∧ ¬T and R ∧ T .
Let H ⊆ H be some assumption of this type about the source. Using a common abuse of notation, the image of H under ΓA
will be denoted as ΓA(H). It is defined as
ΓA(H) =
⋃
h∈H
{ΓA(h)}.
The above results can be applied to such non-elementary assumptions. However, this is not so useful in the case of a single
source, since ΓA(H) = X as long as H is not elementary. The major appeal of non-elementary assumptions in the case of
several sources will become patent in the sequel.
2.2. The case of multiple sources
If there are two sources of information, two approaches can be envisaged:
1. Modifying information items supplied by each source, then merging the resulting belief functions (using Dempster’s
rule [22] or its unnormalized version [29]).
2. Embedding meta-knowledge about the source state inside the merging process.
It is clear that the latter option looks more general and more convincing. In this case, a joint assumption on the relevance
and truthfulness of sources is in order. Denoting byH1 andH2, the set of possible state configurations of each source, the set
of elementary joint state assumptions on sources will be H12 = H1 × H2. Hence, there are 16 possible states of the pair of
sources (h1R, h
1
T , h
2
R, h
2
T ). Uncertainmeta-knowledge about the state of sourcesmust be expressed onH12. In the followingwe
describe the result of making elementary assumptions on sources; then we consider the case of uncertain meta-knowledge
and uncertain sources, and we are led to equip the assumption space itself with a belief structure.
2.2.1. Crisp testimonies and precise meta-knowledge
Suppose that source 1 asserts x ∈ A and source 2 asserts x ∈ B where A, B = X . How to combine these pieces
of information depends on the chosen assumption on the state of sources. Namely, there is a multiple-valued mapping
ΓA,B : H12 → 2X prescribing, for each elementary assumption, the result of the process of merging the two information
items.
1. Suppose both sources are truthful.
(a) If they are both relevant, then one must conclude that x ∈ A ∩ B.
(b) If source 2 (resp. 1) is irrelevant, then one must conclude that x ∈ A (resp. B).
(c) Else x ∈ X .
2. Suppose source 1 truthful and source 2 lies.
(a) If they are both relevant, then one must conclude that x ∈ A ∩ B.
(b) If source 2 (resp. 1) is irrelevant, then one must conclude that x ∈ A (resp. B).
(c) Else x ∈ X .
3. Suppose source 2 is truthful and source 1 lies.
(a) If they are both relevant, then one must conclude that x ∈ A ∩ B.
(b) If source 2 (resp. 1) is irrelevant, then one must conclude that x ∈ A (resp. B).
(c) Else x ∈ X .
4. Suppose both sources lie.
(a) If they are both relevant, then one must conclude that x ∈ A ∩ B.
(b) If source 2 (resp. 1) is irrelevant, then one must conclude that x ∈ A (resp. B).
(c) Else x ∈ X .
Obviously, the four binary connectives A ∩ B, A ∩ B, A ∩ B, and A ∩ B are obtained, depending on the truthfulness
of supposedly relevant sources. Note that elementary assumptions may be incompatible with some available pieces of
2 We use the term “lying” here as a synonym of “not telling the truth”, irrespective of the existence of any intention of an agent to deceive.
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information. For instance, in case of conflicting information (A ∩ B = ∅), case 1a is obviously impossible: either one of the
sources is irrelevant, or one of them lies. Likewise, case A ∩ B = ∅ excludes assumption 2a, and case A ∪ B = X excludes
the assumption that both sources lie.
2.2.2. Crisp testimonies and incomplete meta-knowledge
Other Boolean binary connectives can be retrieved by considering non-trivial non-elementary assumptions H ⊂ H12 on
the state of sources, namely disjunctions of elementary assumptions. In theory, the number of such composite assumptions
is huge (216). In practice, only a few assumptions are interesting to study. Indeed, the resulting information is trivial (x ∈ X
because ΓA,B(H) = X) as soon as H contains an elementary assumption of the form (¬R, h1T ,¬R, h2T ), for instance. Some
forms of non trivial incomplete meta-knowledge are worth considering.
A first kind of non-trivial meta-knowledge consists in guessing the number of truthful and/or relevant sources, by lack
of knowledge on the reliability of individual sources. The interesting cases are as follows (alternative weaker assumptions
of this form generate no information):
• Both sources are relevant, and at least one of them is truthful. This is the disjunction of assumptions 1a, 2a, and 3a. Then,
x ∈ A ∪ B follows.
• Both sources are relevant, exactly one ofwhich is truthful. This is the disjunction of assumptions 2a and3a. Then, x ∈ AB
(exclusive or).
• Both sources are relevant, at most one of which truthful. This is the disjunction of assumptions 2a, 3a, and 4a. Then,
x ∈ A ∪ B.
• Both sources are truthful, and at least one of them is relevant. This is the disjunction of assumptions 1b and 1a. Then,
again x ∈ A ∪ B. The same results would be obtained by assuming truthful sources truthful, exactly one of them being
relevant.
Another kind of meta-knowledge pertains to logical dependence between source states. For instance, onemay know that
both sources are relevant, but source 1 is truthful if and only if source 2 is so too. This is the disjunction of assumptions 1a
and 4a, yielding x ∈ (A∩B)∪ (A∩B), which corresponds to the Boolean equivalence connective. One could likewise retrieve
the connective A ∪ B postulating that:
• Both sources are relevant, but it is impossible that at the same time source 1 lies and source 2 is truthful.
• Or yet that either source 1 is truthful while the other is irrelevant, or source 2 lies and the first one is irrelevant.
This assumption is captured by the implication if B then A, which boils down to the following piece of meta-knowledge: “If
source 2 is truthful, then source 1 is truthful too” (in the case of relevant sources).
It is possible to retrieve almost all binary Boolean connectives of propositional logic (except A⊥B = ∅, already ruled out
in the case of a single source, if one requires that the result of themerging process should be logically consistent). This is not
surprising at all, in some sense. However the point here is that each logical connective can be derived from an assumption
about the global quality of information sources, in terms of truthfulness and relevance. This kind of interpretation has been
known for a long time for union and intersection only [8].
Actually, whenmodeling a complex assumption on quality of sources bymeans of the appropriate connective yielding the
correct ensuing information drawn from these sources, part of the actual meta-information is lost. For instance, x ∈ A ∪ B
is obtained in several distinct situations. However, the information that would result from a finer representation of the
complex assumptions would be different in each case. Namely:
• If sources are both truthful, and exactly one is relevant, then either one should know that x ∈ A or one should know that
x ∈ B (had we known which source is relevant).
• If both sources are relevant, and at least one is truthful, then either one should know that x ∈ A∩ B, or one should know
that x ∈ A ∩ B or yet that x ∈ A ∩ B (had we known which source is truthful).
In both cases, one can derive that we know x ∈ A ∪ B, which is weaker that the most precise pieces of information one
could derive in each case. In order to express these subtle distinctions, modal logic could be instrumental since it is more
expressive than propositional logic. Denoting the modality “to know”, it is widely known thatA∨B is not equivalent
to (andweaker than) the formula(A∩B)∨(A∩B)∨(A∩B) in a standardmodal logic. This line of studywould require
an investigation in epistemic logic [13], and is left for further research. Nevertheless, the reader is referred to Banerjee and
Dubois [1] for a more refined representation in a modal logic framework (and in terms of subsets of the power set of X) of
what an agent knows about the epistemic state of another agent acting as a source of information.
2.2.3. Uncertain testimonies and sure meta-knowledge
Suppose now that one incomplete assumption H ⊂ H12 on the quality of the sources is known to be true. Let ⊗H be
the set-theoretic connective associated to the assumption H in agreement with the above described assignment. Suppose
that source 1 (resp. 2) supplies a mass function mX1 (resp. m
X
2 ). Moreover we postulate that sources are independent in the
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following sense: interpreting mXi (A) as the probability that source i supplies information item x ∈ A, then the probability
that source 1 supplies information item x ∈ A and source 2 supplies at the same time information item x ∈ B is the product
mX1 (A) · mX2 (B).
In this framework, the probability that should be assigned to the possibility of interpreting the joint information supplied
by the sources by the statement x ∈ C ⊆ X is equal to
mX(C) = ∑
A,B:C=A⊗HB
mX1 (A) · mX2 (B). (7)
This result is a straightforward consequence of the claim that if source 1 asserts x ∈ A and source 2 asserts x ∈ B,
then under assumption H, the conclusion should be that x ∈ A ⊗H B is what we actually know. There are 15 variants of
this combination rule including the unnormalized version of Dempster’s rule (also called conjunctive rule) [29] and the
disjunctive rule [7]. Observe that when A ⊗H B = ∅ for two focal sets A and B, each coming from a distinct source, this
conflict no longer pertains to a disagreement inside X between the two sources, but to a conflict between the information
items supplied by the two sources and the meta-assumption H, in space H12 × X . Several approaches make sense to cope
with this conflict:
• Either renormalize the resulting belief function like with Dempster’s rule, which amounts to assuming the correctness
of assumption H, and conditioning on the assumption that sources should not contradict each other.
• Or reject assumption H and prefer one that is compatible with the information supplied by the sources.
Remark. When belief functions built from mass functions mXi are consonant, hence fully represented by their contour
functions considered as possibility distributions πXi : X → [0, 1], one could choose to perform the fusion operation inside
the possibilistic framework [9], replacing combination rule (7) by a fuzzy logic connective that extends⊗H from the Boolean
to the multiple-valued setting.
2.2.4. Crisp testimonies and uncertain meta-knowledge
Nowwe assume some uncertainty about the meta-knowledge regarding source quality. It is natural to try and represent
this meta-uncertainty by means of a mass functionmH on the spaceH of incomplete assumptions, rather than a probability
distributiononH12. At this point,we limit ourselves to the casewhere information suppliedby sources are simple testimonies
of the form x ∈ A and x ∈ B respectively. The result of the merging is a mass functionmX on X defined by:
mX(C) = ∑
H:A⊗HB=C
mH12(H). (8)
This mass function actually induces a probability distribution over the 15 Boolean binary connectives attached to assump-
tions H:
pH12(⊗) = ∑
H:⊗H=⊗
mH12(H). (9)
If one of the sources is non-informative (B = X), only three connectives remain possible (they reduce to C = A, A or X) and
the interpretation of information supplied by a single source is recovered (Section 2.1.1).
This approach is general in the sense that, even if the information supplied by each source is independent from the
information suppliedby theotherone, piecesofmeta-knowledge regarding the statesof each sourcemaynotbe independent.
Such a “meta-independence” between sources may be modeled by assuming that
mH12(H) =
{
mH1(H1)mH2(H2), if H = H1 × H2,
0, otherwise,
(10)
which corresponds to evidential independence [22] between frames H1 and H2 with respect to mH12 . We note that this
notion should not be confused with other notions of independence in evidence theory, as outlined, e.g., in [3,5].
For instance, assume truthful sources with independent probabilities of relevance p1 and p2: for i = 1, 2,
mHi({(Ri, Ti)}) = pi, (11)
mHi({(¬Ri, Ti)}) = 1 − p1. (12)
We then have
mH12({(R1, T1, R2, T2)}) = mH1({(R1, T1)})mH2({(R2, T2)}) = p1p2 (13)
and, similarly,
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mH12({(R1, T1,¬R2, T2)}) = p1(1 − p2), (14)
mH12({(¬R1, T1, R2, T2)}) = (1 − p1)p2, (15)
mH12({(¬R1, T1,¬R2, T2)}) = (1 − p1)(1 − p2), (16)
andmH12(H) = 0 for all other H ⊆ H12.
Furthermore, it is easy to verify, under these specific hypotheses, that it is equivalent to combine discounted testimonies
from each source (with discounting factors p1 and p2) by means of the unnormalized Dempster’s rule, or to use the com-
bination rule (8) proposed above using the mass function mH12 defined by (13)-(16). Indeed, both methods yield the same
mass functionmX :
mX(A ∩ B) = p1p2 (H = (R1, T1, R2, T2));
mX(A) = p1(1 − p2) (H = (R1, T1,¬R2, T2));
mX(B) = (1 − p1)p2 (H = (¬R1, T1, R2, T2));
mX(X) = (1 − p1)(1 − p2) (H = (¬R1, T1,¬R2, T2)).
A more general form of this property will be studied in Section 4.
2.2.5. General case
Consider now the general case where information forwarded by independent sources are belief functions defined by
independent mass functions mX1 and m
X
2 . The two merging operations (7) and (8) can be extended jointly by first selecting
a merging operation⊗with probability pH12(⊗), and then applying combination⊗ between focal sets ofmX1 andmX2 :
mX(C) =∑
H
mH12(H)
∑
A,B:C=A⊗HB
mX1 (A)m
X
2 (B) (17)
=∑
⊗
pH12(⊗) ∑
A,B:C=A⊗B
mX1 (A)m
X
2 (B). (18)
Here again, we may remark that a more formal derivation of the above result in a more general setting will be presented in
Section 4.2 (Lemma 2).
The extension of this approach to the case of n > 2 sources that are more or less certainly truthful and/or relevant
does not raise any theoretical issue. However the computational complexity will increase exponentially (since there will
be 4n elementary assumptions on the global state of sources, hence a 24
n
complexity for the belief function expressing
meta-knowledge on the sources, in the general case).
3. Beyond relevance and truthfulness: a general model of meta-knowledge
In thepreceding section,wehave seen that consideringmeta-knowledge on the relevance and truthfulness of information
sources leads to some interesting results. In particular, a new correction scheme has been introduced, which generalizes
the notions of discounting and complement of a belief function. It also becomes possible to reinterpret all connectives of
Boolean logic in terms of assumptions with respect to the relevance and truthfulness of information sources. Furthermore,
a general combination rule has been derived, which generalizes the unnormalized version of Dempster’s rule to all Boolean
connectives and that integrates the uncertainties pertaining to assumptions concerning the possible behavior or state of the
sources in the fusion process itself.
In some applications, it may happen that one has finer or even different meta-knowledge on the sources than knowing
their relevance and truthfulness. It seems interesting to be able to use such meta-knowledge. In this section, an approach to
account for general source behavior assumptions is proposed, through a generalization of the preceding section. We study
first the single source case before continuing with the multiple sources case.
3.1. The case of a single source
The notions of relevance and truthfulnesswere formalized in Section 2.1 usingmultivaluedmappingsΓA fromH = R×T
to X , for each A ⊆ X . In this section, we propose a generalization of this setting to account for general source behavior
assumptions.
3.1.1. Crisp testimony and certain meta-knowledge
Let us suppose that a source S provides a piece of information on the value taken by a variable y defined on a domain
Y . We suppose that this piece of information takes the form y ∈ A, for some A ⊆ Y . Let us further assume that the
source may be in N elementary states instead of four (as is the case in Section 2.1.1), i.e., we generalize the frame from
H = {(R, T), (R,¬T), (¬R, T), (¬R,¬T)} to H = {h1, . . . , hN} (N does not need to be greater than or equal to four, as
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illustrated in Example 1 below). In addition, we consider that we are not so much interested in the value taken by y, as by
the related value taken by a variable x defined on a domain X (x and y may or may not be the same parameter). Let us also
assume thatwe have at our disposal somemeta-knowledge that relate the piece of information y ∈ A provided by the source
on Y to an information of the form x ∈ B, for some B ⊆ X , for each possible state h ∈ H of the source.
The reasoning described in the previous paragraph can be formalized as follows. For each A ⊆ Y , we define amultivalued
mapping ΓA from H to X . ΓA(h) indicates how to interpret on X the piece of information y ∈ A provided by the source in
each configuration h of the source. As done in Section 2.1.2, wemay also consider non elementary hypothesesH ⊆ H, whose
image by ΓA is ΓA(H) = ∪h∈HΓA(h).
It is easy to see that the setting introduced in Section 2.1.1 is a particular case of this general scheme, with N = 4 and
y = x and where the multivalued mappings ΓA are defined by, for all A ⊆ X:
ΓA(h1) = A,
ΓA(h2) = A,
ΓA(h3) = ΓA(h4) = X. (19)
The states h1, h2, h3 and h4 then respectively correspond to the hypotheses (R, T), (R,¬T), (¬R, T) and (¬R,¬T). More
generally this framework also covers known canonical examples for belief function design such as the randomly coded
message example, provided by Shafer and Tversky [24].
Furthermore, let us illustrate this general setting using two examples, where meta-knowledge on sources is not limited
to notions of relevance and truthfulness.
Example1 (Case y = x, inspired fromShafer [23]). Letus assume thatweare interestedby theamountofmoneyGlennpaid for
his coffee dues. Besides, we consider that there are only four possible amounts: 0, $1, $5 or $10. The only informationwehave
on this amount comes from a person, named Bill, that we do not know very well and that may be informed, approximately
informedorunreliable. If Bill is informed,whatever amountheprovides shouldbe accepted. If Bill is approximately informed,
the amountheprovides shouldbeexpandedusing the lowest andhighest closest amounts (e.g., $1 is expanded to {0, $1, $5}).
If Bill is unreliable, the amount he provides cannot be used and we are left in our state of ignorance.
Using the general scheme proposed above, we may formalize this problem as follows. We have H = {informed,
approximately informed, unreliable} = {h1, h2, h3} and X = {0, $1, $5, $10} = {x1, x2, x3, x4}. Let Ak,r denote the subset{xk, . . . , xr}, for 1 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ 4 and let I denote the set of intervals of X: I = {Ak,r, 1 ≤ k ≤ r ≤ 4}. By convention, we
consider that the piece of information provided by Bill is one of the intervals in I. We may then define the various states of
the source as follows:
ΓAk,r (informed) = Ak,r,
ΓAk,r (ap-informed) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{xk−1} ∪ Ak,r ∪ {xr+1} if k > 1 and r < 4,
Ak,r ∪ {xr+1} if k = 1 and r < 4,
{xk−1} ∪ Ak,r if k > 1 and r = 4,
Ak,r if k = 1 and r = 4,
ΓAk,r (unreliable) = X.
Example 2 (Case Y = X , inspired from Janez and Appriou [14]). Let us assume that we are interested in finding the type of a
given road, which can only be a track, a lane or a highway. We have a source at our disposal that provides information on
this type. However, the source has but a limited perception of the possible types of road and in particular is not aware of the
existence of the type “lane”. In addition, we know that this source discriminate between roads either using their width or
their texture (width and texture are called attributes in [14]). If the source uses the road width, then when it says “track”, it
is clear that we may only safely infer that the type is “track or lane” since tracks and lanes have similar width, and when it
says “highway”, wemay infer “highway”. On the other hand, if the source uses the road texture, thenwhen it says “track”, we
may infer “track”, and when it says “highway”, we may only infer “highway or lane” since highways and lanes have similar
textures.
Using the approach proposed above, we may formalize this problem as follows. We have Y = {track, highway}, X =
{track, lane, highway},H = {width, texture} and
Γtrack(width) = {track, lane} ,
Γhighway(width) = {highway} ,
ΓY (width) = X,
Γtrack(texture) = {track} ,
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Γhighway(texture) = {lane, highway} ,
ΓY (texture) = X.
3.1.2. Behavior-based correction scheme
The approach described in the previous section may be generalized to the case where the source provides uncertain
information in the form of amass functionmYS andmeta-knowledge on the source are uncertain. Assuming some hypothesis
H ⊆ H on the behavior of the source, then each mass mYS (A) should be transferred to ΓA(H), yielding the following mass
function:
mX(B|H) = ∑
A:ΓA(H)=B
mYS (A), (20)
for all B ⊆ X .
In themore general situation where we have uncertain meta-knowledge described by amass functionmH onH, then we
get
mX(B) = ∑
H
mX(B|H)mH(H) = ∑
H
mH(H)
∑
A:ΓA(H)=B
mYS (A), (21)
for all B ⊆ X , which clearly generalizes (5). The correction mechanism defined by (21) will be hereafter referred to as
Behavior-Based Correction (BBC). A more formal derivation of (21) will be provided in Section 4.2 (Lemma 1).
In addition, let us remark that the BBC procedure generalizes a familiar operation of Dempster–Shafer theory, called
conditional embedding or ballooning extension [26,27]. Let us explicitly reinterpret this operation in terms of source behavior
assumptions. The ballooning extension is the process that transforms a mass function mY defined on a domain Y into a
mass function on an extended space X , where X ⊇ Y . LetmY⇑X denote the ballooning extension ofmY to X . It is defined as
mY⇑X(B) = mY (A) if B = A ∪ (X\Y) andmY⇑X(B) = 0 otherwise. Suppose that a source S provides a piece of information
on the value taken by a parameter x defined on a domain X . We assume further that the information provided by S takes
the form of a mass functionmYS on the domain Y ⊆ X . We consider that there may be two reasons why the source provides
a piece of information on the value taken by x on the domain Y instead of X: either the source has a limited perception of
the actual domain of x or it knows that the values in X\Y are impossible. Let h1 denote the state where the source has a
limited perception of the actual domain of x and let h2 denote the state where the source knows the values in X\Y to be
impossible. We associate to these two states the multivalued mappings ΓA, A ⊆ Y , from H = {h1, h2} to X defined by, for
all A ⊆ Y :
ΓA(h1) = A ∪ (Y\X), (22)
ΓA(h2) = A. (23)
ΓA(h1) translates the idea that when the source states x ∈ A, A ⊆ Y , we may only safely conclude that x ∈ A ∪ (X\Y),
due to the limited perception of the source. Let mH represent our meta-knowledge on the behavior of the source. If
mH is such that mH({h1}) = 1 and if we use the BBC procedure to transform mYS into a mass function on X , then the
ballooning extension is recovered. The ballooning extension can thus be seen as a correction scheme corresponding to
a particular assumption on the behavior of the source with respect to its limited perception of the actual domain of a
variable.
The ballooning extension is the most well-known representative of so-called deconditioning methods [15]. To complete
the picture on the relationship between the BBC and these methods, we may remark that another deconditioning method,
known as the method by association of highest compatible hypotheses [15] and that generalizes the ballooning extension,
can also be seen as a particular case of the BBC scheme. Similarly to the ballooning extension, thismethod transforms amass
function mY defined on a domain Y into a mass function on an extended space X , where X contains all the elements of Y
and some new elements. However, this transformation is guided by a compatibility relation ω : 2Y → 2X\Y , where ω(A),
A ⊆ Y , represents the set of hypotheses in X\Y with which the hypotheses of Y contained in A are strongly compatible. For
instance, in Example 2 above, the transformation based on road width of the type “track” to “track or lane” and of the type
“highway” to “highway” relies on such compatibility relation ω, where Y = {track, highway}, X = {track, lane, highway},
and ω(track) = lane and ω(highway) = ∅.
Let mY⇑ωX denote the extension of mY to X using the method by association of highest compatible hypotheses. It is
defined asmY⇑ωX(B) = mY (A) if B = A ∪ ω(A) andmY⇑ωX(B) = 0 otherwise. The ballooning extension is recovered when
ω(A) = X\Y , for all A ⊆ Y . As the ballooning extension, it is easy to see that themethod by association of highest compatible
hypothesesis is a particular case of the BBC (simply replace ΓA(h1) = A ∪ (Y\X) in (22) by ΓA(h1) = A ∪ ω(A)). The state
h1 then corresponds to a particular attribute, such as road width, used by the source to discriminate the hypotheses in Y ,
as an attribute defines a particular compatibility relation. This deconditioning method can thus also be seen as a correction
scheme corresponding to a hypothesis on the behavior of the source.
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3.2. The case of multiple sources
Let us now consider that we have two sources S1 and S2, each of which may be in one of N elementary states (those N
states are the same for both sources). It is convenient to denote by hij the state j of source Si, for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, . . . ,N.
Accordingly, let Hi =
{
hi1, . . . , h
i
N
}
denote the possible states of source Si, i = 1, 2. The set of elementary hypotheses on
the source behaviors will beH12 = H1 × H2.
3.2.1. Crisp testimonies and certain meta-knowledge
Let us assume that source S1 states y ∈ A and S2 states y ∈ B, A, B ⊆ Y . What can be concluded about X after merging
these pieces of informationwill depend on the hypothesismade on the behavior of the sources.We can define amultivalued
mapping ΓA,B from H12 to X , which assigns to each elementary hypothesis h = (h1, h2), h ∈ H12, the result of the fusion
of the two pieces of information y ∈ A and y ∈ B. As we must conclude ΓA(h1) when S1 is in state h1 ∈ H1, and we must
conclude ΓB(h
2) when S2 is in state h
2 ∈ H2, where ΓA and ΓB are the mappings defined in Section 3.1.1, it is clear that we
must conclude ΓA(h
1) ∩ ΓB(h2)when the sources are in state (h1, h2) ∈ H12. Hence, the mapping ΓA,B is defined by
ΓA,B(h) = ΓA(h1) ∩ ΓB(h2),
for all h ∈ H12.
3.2.2. Behavior-based fusion scheme
Following the same path as that of Section 2.2, we can generalize the above approach by allowing both the information
provided by the source and our meta-knowledge about the source to be uncertain.
Let us assume that S1 and S2 provide information on Y in the form of two mass functions m
Y
1 and m
Y
2 , respectively, and
that they are independent. If we know that hypothesis H ⊆ H12 holds, then the massmY1(A)mY2(B) should be transferred to
the set
C = ΓA,B(H) =
⋃
(h1,h2)∈H
(ΓA(h
1) ∩ ΓB(h2)).
The result of the fusion ofmY1 andm
Y
2 given H ⊆ H12 is then the mass functionmX(·|H) defined by:
mX(C|H) = ∑
A,B:C=ΓA,B(H)
mY1(A) m
Y
2(B), (24)
for all C ⊆ X . When meta-knowledge onH12 is represented by a mass functionmH12 , we then get:
mX(C) = ∑
H
mX(C|H)mH12(H) = ∑
H
mH12(H)
∑
A,B:C=ΓA,B(H)
mY1(A)m
Y
2(B), (25)
for allC ⊆ X . Eq. (25)will be referred toasBehavior-Based Fusion (BBF). It is clearly ageneralizationof thegeneral combination
rule proposed in Section 2.2.5. A more formal derivation of this rule will be presented in Section 4.2 (Lemma 2).
As a final remark in this section, we may note that the fusion process can be cast in more general settings than those
considered here. In particular, one may face problems where sources Si, i = 1, . . . , n, provide information on different
frames Yi and admit different numbers Ni of elementary states. It is interesting to note that in such a setting, an equation
similar to (25) can easily be obtained and a result similar to the one thatwill be shown in the next section still holds. Although
this setting is more general, we have refrained from introducing it in this paper in order to improve readability.
4. Commutativity between correction and fusion schemes with meta-independent sources
As we did at the end of Section 2.2.4, let us now assume sources are meta-independent, i.e., that the mass functionmH12
expressing our uncertain meta-knowledge satisfies (10). Under this assumption, wemay wonder whether it is equivalent to
combine two mass functionsmY1 andm
Y
2 using the BBF rule, or to apply the BBC procedure tom
Y
1 andm
Y
2 , and combine the
transformed mass functions by the unnormalized Dempster’s rule (Fig. 1). In order to answer this question, we need first to
recall the definitions of some operations related to the use of belief functions defined on product spaces.
4.1. Operations on product spaces
LetmX×Y denote a mass function defined on the Cartesian product X × Y of the domains of two parameters x and y. The
marginal mass functionmX×Y↓X is defined as
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Fig. 1. Two ways of combining two mass functions mY1 and m
Y
2 using meta-knowledge about the sources: using the BBC procedure (left) and using the BBF rule
(right). The equivalence between these two methods under the meta-independence assumption is proved in this section.
mX×Y↓X(A) = ∑
{B⊆X×Y,(B↓X)=A}
mX×Y (B), ∀A ⊆ X,
where (B ↓ X) denotes the projection of B onto X .
Conversely, letmX be a mass function defined on X . Its vacuous extension [22] on X × Y is defined as:
mX↑X×Y (B) =
{
mX(A) if B = A × Y for some A ⊆ X,
0, otherwise.
Given twomass functionsmX1 andm
Y
2 , their combination by the unnormalized Dempster’s rule on X × Y can be obtained
by combining their vacuous extensions on X × Y . Formally:
mX1 ∩©mY2 = mX↑X×Y1 ∩©mY↑X×Y2 .
Let mU and mV be two mass functions on product spaces U and V . The following property, referred to as “Distributivity
of marginalization over combination” [25], holds:
(mU ∩©mV )↓U = mU ∩©mV↓U∩V , (26)
where U ∩ V denotes, by convention, the Cartesian product of frames common to U and V .
4.2. Meta-independence result
Let us consider again the setting of Section 3.1, in which three distinct pieces of evidence are defined:
1. A mass functionmYS on Y provided by source S.
2. A mass functionmH onH = {h1, . . . , hN} representing our uncertain meta-knowledge on the source.
3. For each A ⊆ Y , a multivalued mapping ΓA from H to X indicating how to interpret on X the piece of information
y ∈ A ⊆ Y provided by the source in each configuration h ∈ H.
The lastpieceof evidencedefinesa relationbetweenspacesH,Y andX ,whichmaybe representedby the followingcategorical
mass function onH× Y × X:
m
H×Y×X
Γ
⎡
⎣ ⋃
h∈H,A⊆Y
({h} × A × ΓA(h))
⎤
⎦ = 1. (27)
The three mass functions mYS , m
H and mH×Y×XΓ can be seen as defining an evidential network, as shown in Fig. 2a. As
will be shown below, the BBC procedure is equivalent to combining these three mass functions using Dempter’s rule, and
marginalizing the result on X .
By combiningmYS withm
H×Y×X
Γ and marginalizing onH× X , we get a mass functionmH×XSΓ onH× X , defined by:
m
H×X
SΓ
⎡
⎣⋃
h∈H
({h} × ΓA(h))
⎤
⎦ = mYS (A), ∀A ⊆ Y . (28)
For instance, letH be the spaceH = R×T , let Y = X and let themultivaluedmappingsΓA be defined by (19) for all A ⊆ Y .
The mass functionm
H×X
SΓ is then given by
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Evidential networks corresponding to the BBC procedure (a) and the BBF rule (b).
m
H×X
SΓ (({h1} × A) ∪ ({h2} × A) ∪ ({h3} × X) ∪ ({h4} × X)) = mYS (A),
for all A ⊆ Y .
The following lemma states that the mass function given by the BBC (21) can be obtained by combiningm
H×X
SΓ withm
H,
and marginalizing on X .
Lemma 1. We have, for all B ⊆ X(
m
H×X
SΓ ∩©mH
)↓X
(B) = mX(B),
where mX is the mass function defined by (21).
Proof. LetmH×X = mH×XSΓ ∩©mH. It can be computed as follows:
mH×X (C) =
{
mH(H) · mYS (A) if C = (
⋃
h∈H {h} × ΓA(h)) ∩ (H × X),
0 otherwise.
Now, for all H ⊆ H and all A ⊆ Y ,⎡
⎣
⎛
⎝⋃
h∈H
{h} × ΓA(h)
⎞
⎠ ∩ (H × X)
⎤
⎦ ↓ X = ⋃
h∈H
ΓA(h) = ΓA(H).
Therefore,mH×X↓X(B) for any B ⊆ X can be obtained by summing over all H ⊆ H and all A ⊆ Y such that ΓA(H) = B:
mH×X↓X(B) = ∑
H,A:ΓA(H)=B
mH(H) · mYS (A),
which is equivalent to (21). 
This lemma shows that BBC, and thus deconditioning methods, the discounting operation, the complement of a belief
function and the correction scheme introduced in Section 2, can be obtained by defining an evidential network onH×Y ×X
and by propagating uncertainty in this network using the unnormalized Dempster’s rule.
Let us now consider the setting of Section 3.2. We consider two sources S1 and S2, which provide items of evidence m
Y
1
andmY2 on Y , respectively. Letm
H12 be a mass function onH12 = H1 × H2 representing our uncertain meta-knowledge on
the sources. As before, the mappings ΓA for all A ⊆ Y induce mass functionsmHi×Y×XΓ i , i = 1, 2 of the form (27). These mass
functions define the evidential network shown in Fig. 2b. By combiningm
Hi×Y×X
Γ i withm
Y
i and marginalizing onHi × X , we
get mass functionsm
Hi×X
iΓ , i = 1, 2 with the following expressions:
m
Hi×X
iΓ
⎡
⎣ ⋃
h∈Hi
({h} × ΓA(h))
⎤
⎦ = mYi (A), ∀A ⊆ Y .
As expressed by the following lemma, themass functionmX computed by the BBF rule (25) can be obtained by combining
mass functionsm
Hi×X
iΓ , i = 1, 2 withmH12 , and marginalizing the result on X:
F. Pichon et al. / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 53 (2012) 159–175 171
Lemma 2. We have, for all B ⊆ X(
m
H1×X
1Γ ∩©m
H2×X
2Γ ∩©mH12
)↓X
(B) = mX(B), (29)
where mX is the mass function defined by (25).
Proof. Letm
H12×X
12Γ be themass functionobtainedby combining thefirst twomass functions in (29).Wehave, for allA, B ⊆ Y :
m
H12×X
12Γ (C) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
mY1(A) · mY2(B) if C =
⋃
(h1,h2)∈H12
{(h1, h2)} × (ΓA(h1) ∩ ΓB(h2))
0 otherwise.
By combining the above mass function withmH12 , we get a new mass functionmH12×X defined by
mH12×X(C) = mH12(H) · mY1(A) · mY2(B)
if
C =
⎛
⎝ ⋃
(h1,h2)∈H12
{
(h1, h2)
}
× (ΓA(h1) ∩ ΓB(h2))
⎞
⎠ ∩ (H × X)
andmH12×X(C) = 0 otherwise.
Now, for all H ⊆ H12 and for all A, B ⊆ Y ,[(⋃
(h1,h2)∈H12
{
(h1, h2)
}
× (ΓA(h1) ∩ ΓB(h2))
)
∩ (H × X)
]
↓ X
= ⋃(h1,h2)∈H(ΓA(h1) ∩ ΓB(h2)) = ΓA,B(H).
Therefore, mH12×X↓X(C) for C ⊆ X can be obtained by summing over all H ⊆ H1 × H2 and all A, B ⊆ Y such that
ΓA,B(H) = C:
mH12×X↓X(C) = ∑
H,A,B:ΓA,B(H)=C
mH12(H) · mY1(A) · mY2(B)
which is equivalent to (25). 
This lemma shows that the BBF rule, and thus the generalization of the unnormalized version of Dempster’s rule to all
Boolean connectives, can be obtained by defining an evidential network onH12 × Y × X and by propagating uncertainty in
this network using the unnormalized Dempster’s rule. In addition, this implies that the fusion schemes studied in this paper
can be recovered using the unnormalized Dempster’s rule and marginalization.
Theorem 1. With meta-independent sources, it is equivalent to combine the uncertain information mY1 and m
Y
2 by the BBF rule
or to combine by the unnormalized Dempster’s rule each of these pieces of information corrected using the BBC procedure.
Proof. Let mH1 and mH2 represent our uncertain meta-knowledge on the behaviors of two sources S1 and S2, respectively.
Meta-independence of S1 and S2 is equivalent tom
H12 = mH1 ∩©mH2 , wheremH12 represent our uncertain meta-knowledge
on the sources. Under this assumption, we thus have, with the same notations as above:
m
H1×X
1Γ ∩©m
H2×X
2Γ ∩©mH12 = mH1×X1Γ ∩©mH2×X2Γ ∩©mH1 ∩©mH2 .
Marginalizing onH1 × X , we get, using (26):(
m
H1×X
1Γ ∩©m
H2×X
2Γ ∩©mH1 ∩©mH2
)↓H1×X = mH1×X1Γ ∩©mH1 ∩© (mH2×X2Γ ∩©mH2)↓X ,
which, after further marginalization on X , becomes:(
m
H1×X
1Γ ∩©m
H2×X
2Γ ∩©mH1 ∩©mH2
)↓X = (mH1×X1Γ ∩©mH1)↓X ∩© (mH2×X2Γ ∩©mH2)↓X .
The theorem then follows from Lemmas 1 and 2. 
Let us note that a similar theorem holds for the case of N sources instead of 2. This is a direct consequence of Lemma 2
being straightforwardly generalizable to the case of N sources.
This theorem leads to an interesting remark: the method, often used in applications, that consists in discounting sources
and then combining them by the unnormalized Dempster’s rule, can be seen as a particular case of the BBF rule. Indeed,
without lack of generality, consider the case of two sources S1 and S2. The discount and combine method corresponds to
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truthful sources with independent probabilities p1 and p2 of relevance, i.e., to a meta-knowledgem
H12 on the sources such
thatmH12 = mH1 ∩©mH2 , withmH1 ,mH2 andmH12 defined by (11)–(16).
Anotherpopularmethod for taking into accountmeta-knowledgeon the reliability of the sources is to computeaweighted
average of the mass functions to be combined. Indeed, as remarked by Shafer [22, p. 253], this methods yield results similar
to those obtained by Dempster’s rule applied to equally discounted mass functions, when the discount rate tends to 1.
Interestingly, theweighted average rule is also a special case of the BBF rule. Themass functionm resulting from theweighted
average of two mass functions m1 and m2 provided by two sources S1 and S2 is defined by m = w · m1 + (1 − w) · m2,
w ∈ [0, 1], wherew is the relative reliability of S1. It is clear that the weighted average results frommeta-knowledge on the
sources described by the following mass function
mH12({(R1, T1,¬R2, T2)}) = w,
mH12({(¬R1, T1, R2, T2)}) = 1 − w,
which is clearly different from that defined by (13)–(16) and associated to the discount and combine method.
5. Relation to previous work
The idea of exploitingmeta-knowledge about the sources of information for correcting or combining belief functions has
been explored by several researchers. This section discusses the relation between the notions introduced in Sections 2 and
3 and previous work on similar topics.
5.1. Related work on information correction
As already mentioned, the approach developed in Section 2.1 extends the discounting operation, introduced by Shafer
[22] and formalized by Smets [27]. This basicmodel corresponds to the casewhere the source is known to be truthful, but has
only a probability of being relevant. In [30], Smets proposed a counterpart to this model, in which the source is relevant but
may not be truthful. Smets described a scenario inwhich a “deceiver agent”may replace a belief function by its complement,
and he proposed solutions to detect and remedy such a situation. The model introduced in Section 2.1 clearly subsumes
these two basic models.
An extension of the discounting operation, called contextual discounting, was introduced by Mercier et al. in [18]. In this
approach, a binary frameR for the relevance of the source is introduced as in classical discounting. Additionally, a coarsening
 of X is defined, and conditional mass functionsmR(·|θ) onR given θ , for each θ ∈ , are postulated. A discounted mass
function on X is obtained by combining the mass function mXS provided by the source with the conditional mass functions
mR(·|θ), θ ∈ . In [17],Mercier et al. further generalize thismodel by allowing theuser to specify conditionalmass functions
mR(·|A) for any A ⊆ X . A crucial assumption in the contextual discounting model and its variants is that of independence
between the itemsof evidence introduced in themodel. This correction scheme is, in a sense, simpler than theone introduced
in Section 2.1, in that it has no “truthfulness” component. On the other hand, it is based on more complex meta-knowledge
about the source, as beliefs on R are assessed conditionally on different contexts, corresponding to different hypotheses
about the variable x of interest. A more complex model incorporating both R and T components, and conditional mass
functions onR× T given hypotheses about X could obviously be defined, if required by applications.
In [16], Mercier et al. also proposed another extension of the discounting operation, in which uncertain meta-knowledge
on the source S is quantified by a mass function mH on the space H = {h1, . . . , hN} of possible states of the source. The
interpretation of those states h ∈ H is given by transformationsmXh ofmXS : if the source is in state h and if it provides themass
function mXS , then we must adopt m
X
h as the representation of our state of belief. This is formalized using conditional mass
function by postulating that mX(·|h,mXS ) = mXh , where mX(·|h,mXS ) represents our uncertainty on X in a context where h
holds and the source provides information mXS . This correction scheme is comparable to BBC introduced in Section 3.1, in
that it expresses meta-knowledge about the source in a frame of N arbitrary states. The two models coincide in the special
case where the mass functionmH onH is Bayesian, andmXh is defined frommXS using multivalued mappings ΓA as:
mXh (B) =
∑
A:ΓA(h)=B
mYS (A), ∀B ⊆ X,
in which case both models yield
mX = ∑
h∈H
mH({h}) · mXh .
However, the two models are distinct in the general case, and the choice of one model or another should be guided by the
nature of available knowledge in each specific application.
Finally, we should alsomention in this section thework of Haenni and Hartmann [12], who proposed amodel of partially
relevant information sources. In this model, each source Si is assumed to provide information on a binary variable HYP in
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Table 1
Mappings ΓA corresponding to the PD
model of Haenni and Hartmann [12].
h Γ{0}(h) Γ{1}(h)
100 {0} {1}
110 {0} {1}
101 {0} {1}
111 {0} {1}
000 {0, 1} ∅
010 {0} {1}
001 {1} {0}
011 ∅ {0, 1}
the form of a binary report REPi. Each source generates its report according to s independent variables, possibly including
the hypothesis HYP in question. Based on various hypotheses about the relation between REPi and the underlying variables,
a taxonomy of models is generated. Although, at first glance, this formalism seems to be different from ours, our approach
happens upon closer examination to bemore general. Consider, for instance, the PDmodel, which is one of themost complex
models described in [12]. In this model, the report is generated by the source as follows: if the source is reliable (REL = 1),
then REP = HYP. IF REL = 0, then REP is equal to random variable P if HYP = 1, and it is equal to a random variable Q if
HYP = 0. The three random variables REL, P and Q are assumed to be independent, and the model has three parameters
ρ = Pr(REL = 1), p = Pr(P = 1) and q = Pr(Q = 1). With our notations, this model can be translated as follows. Let
Y = {0, 1} the frame of REP, and H = {0, 1}3 the frame of the triple (REL, P,Q). The joint probability distribution of this
triple defines a Bayesian mass function mH on H; for instance, mH({(1, 0, 1)}) = ρ(1 − p)q. Finally, the mappings ΓA for
A = {0} and A = {1} are given in Table 1. All other models described by Haenni and Hartmann could be translated in a
similar way.
5.2. Related work on information fusion
The idea of defining alternatives to Dempster’s rule by replacing intersection with other set-theoretic operations can be
traced to Smets’ 1978 thesis [26], in which he introduced the disjunctive rule of combination together with the Generalised
Bayes Theorem (see also [27] for a more accessible reference). This approach was generalized to arbitrary set operations
by Dubois and Prade [7] and Yager [32]. In [11], Haenni noticed that the disjunctive rule could be deduced by defining an
evidential network with two binary framesR1 andR2 for the reliability of the two sources, and combining mass functions
mX1 andm
X
2 with a categorical mass function onR1×R2 expressing that at least one of the two sources is reliable. Themodel
defined in Section 2.2 is clearly an extension of this simple framework.
In [28], Smets introduced two families of combination rules depending on a parameterα, which he calledα-conjunctions
and α-disjunctions. These two families are basically the only sets of linear operators with a commutative monoid structure.
The α-conjunctions include the unnormalized Dempster’s rule (for α = 1) and admit the vacuous mass function as neutral
element. The α-disjunctions range between the disjunctive rule and a rule corresponding to the exclusive OR, and admit
the contradiction (m(∅) = 1) as neutral element. In [28], Smets derived these rules from axiomatic requirements, but
admitted that they lacked a clear interpretation for α ∈ (0, 1). In [19,21], Pichon provided such an interpretation in terms
of truthfulness of the sources. For instance, he showed that the α-conjunction results from the following assumptions:
1. The two sources are relevant, and either both truthful, or both non truthful (i.e., the operator⊗ is logical equivalence).
2. The degree of belief in the hypothesis that at least one of sources is truthful, conditionally to each value x ∈ X , is equal
to α.
Under these assumptions, the α-conjunction can be obtained by defining a belief network in T1 × T2 × X , and combining all
pieces of evidence, assumed to be independent. The α-disjunction can be obtained in a similar way, starting from different
assumptions about the truthfulness of the sources.
As shown in Section 4, the approach developed in Section 2.2, and extended in Section 3.2 can also be derived from
uncertainty propagation in an evidential network, in which some variablesmay be related to the truthfulness of the sources.
Although each of the two families of α-junctions relies on a single parameter, the interpretation of this parameter is not
easy to disclose, and the independence assumptions involved in the model do not seem very natural. In contrast, the model
developed in this paper allows us to represent richer forms of meta-knowledge and it lends itself to easier interpretation.
6. Conclusion
We have proposed a general approach to the correction and fusion of belief functions, which integrates an agent’s meta-
knowledge on the truthfulness and relevance of the sources of information. This formalism considerably extends Shafer’s
discounting operation, which deals only with the relevance of sources, as well as the unnormalized Dempster’s rule. The
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obtained results can be applied, in particular, to all domains where information sources are intelligent agents able to lie,
independently of their competence to provide information.
We have further extended this approach by allowing for general source behavior assumptions that go beyond the notions
of relevance and truthfulness. This extension is potentially useful for various applications and, in particular, those involving
information sources defined on different frames.
We have then shown that the correction and fusion schemes introduced in this paper can be obtained by defining
particular evidential networks and by propagating uncertainty in these networks using the unnormalized Dempster’s rule.
Using a well-known property of belief functions defined on product spaces, we have proved that commutativity between
correction and fusion processes holds, when the behaviors of the sources are independent.
Finally, the proposed formal representation of meta-knowledge on the behavior of information sources turns out to be
somewhat similar to, but arguably more general and flexible than other approaches introduced in the Dempster–Shafer
framework.
One line for further research is to extend the framework to the case of sources reporting to the agent what other sources
reported to them. In other words, instead of considering several parallel testimonies, one may consider a series of agents,
each reporting to the next one what the previous agent reported. There are then several uncertain information distortion
steps in a row by sources having uncertain behavior. Interestingly, this alternative line of research is already present in the
entry “Probabilité” in D’Alembert and Diderot Encyclopedia. Recently, Cholvy [2] also investigated this issue. Eventually one
may consider the case of series-parallel networks of more or less reliable sources with uncertain information flows.
Another interesting perspective is the possibility to learn the behavior of sources by comparing the pieces of informa-
tion provided by those sources with the ground truth, as done in a simple framework for discounting [10] and contextual
discounting [18].
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